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DISTRIBUTING PUBLICATIONS IN THE 
UNIVERSITY MARKETPLACE 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the University of Minnesota two years ago, the College Republicans 
organization was ordered to stop distributing fliers containing jokes 
that school officials thought might offend some women and homosex-
uals. In defense of the action, University Vice President Marvalene 
Hughes insisted: "This is not a free speech issue."1 At Monmouth 
College in West Long Beach, New Jersey, Student Affairs Vice President 
Mary Anne Nagy said she "only [was] acting in the best interest of the 
school" when she removed 2,500 copies of a campus paper from 
distribution bins to prevent visiting parents from seeing an article about 
an assault on campus. 2 And at Dartmouth College, after copies of a 
conservative campus paper repeatedly had been stolen, College Spokes-
man Alex Huppe said the College considered the stolen papers to be 
litter and abandoned property, deserving of no more protection than 
"menus and free samples of soap."3 Dean of Students Lee Pelton added 
that the problem was "a distribution issue, not a free speech issue."4 
What Pelton, Hughes, Nagy and far too many other university ad-
ministrators apparently do not understand is that distribution issues 
very often are free expression issues. No message is viable without 
some kind of distribution or amplification, which makes protecting the 
dissemination of ideas as important as protecting their creation. Too 
• B.A., University of Minnesota, 1991; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School; 
M.A. candidate, School of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of Minnesota. 
Research Assistant at The Freedom Forum, WasWngton, D.C. 
1. Free Speech: A Course the 'U' Should Consider Taking, STAR TRIB. , Sept. 21 , 
1993. at 12A. 
2. The EdUcation of Ideas, STUDBNT PRESS LAw CENTER REPORT, Winter 1994-95, at 
~; liindsight is A lways 20/20: Admini.strator Apologizes for Snatching Newspapers, 
1'UDBNT PRESS LAw CBNTBlt REPORT, Winter 1994-95, at 9. 
O. 3. Good Enough to Steal: CoHege Papers Are Stolen Across the Notion as Students 
l~:ose of Words Rather Than Disprove Them, STUDENT PRESS LAw CENTBR REPORT. Fall 
, at 9. 
July ~. Greg Miller, Bonfire of the Profanities: Campus Thefts Protest Press, L.A. TIMES, 
8, 1993, at AS. 
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often, that protection is denied by university officials who treat distri-
bution and access as merely administrative, not constitutional, prob-
lems. As the United States Supreme Court consistently has recognized,s 
however, the distribution of publications is expressive activity and 
restrictions on distribution are subject to First Amendment limitations. 6 
Unfortunately, these principles are not always apparent. They have 
become lost in a thicket of disjointed court decisions. This article 
attempts to make sense of those decisions and to offer an alternative 
approach. The article identifies and analyzes the most common practical 
and constitutional pitfalls that accompany university restrictions on the 
distribution of publications/ and urges that the best approach is one 
founded on educational principles rather than existing legal principles. 
As the number of new publications expands, distribution problems 
at public universities are increasingly common. The explosion of desk-
top publishing technology has made it easy for individuals lad~ing 
access to more traditional media to create their own publications. These 
underground newspapers and "zines"B have become important and 
pervasive vehicles for fringe expression,s especially among college 
students who have the time, energy and computer access to produce 
them. Formal and informal student groups also are taking advantage of 
this technology to produce publications through which they can ad-
vance their causes and promote their activities. In addition to these 
smaller and more discrete publications, major alternative publications 
have emerged on some campuses and are competing directly with the 
established, university-supported papers. In fact, many of these publi-
cations began as more obscure "zines. "10 
5. See. e.g .• Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness. 452 U.S . 640. 
647, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2563 (1981); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462, 91 S. 
Ct. 828, 842 (1971) ; Martin v. Struthers, 310 U.S. 141, 143 , 60 S. Ct. 879, 880 (1943); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 U.S . 105, 111-12, 63 S. Ct. 870, 874 (1943); Schneider v. 
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S. Ct. 146, 150 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 452, 58 S. Ct. 666, 669 (1938). 
6. Of course, the limitations imposed by the First Amendment only apply to officials 
at public colleges and universities . The First Amendment is almost never a barrier to 
restrictions on expressive activity on private college campuses by private college admin-
istrators. See infra note 181 . 
7. The term "publication" is defined broadly in this article; the term encompasses 
traditional newspapers and magazines, as well as fliers, newsletters, catalogs. coupon 
books, business cards and virtually anything else that contains words or pictures on a 
page. 
B. A "zine" generally is a homemade publication produced on a personal computer 
by an individual writer/publisher. Zines typically are specialized publications that deal 
with either particular topics or particular viewpoints. See generally Kristin Tillotson, 
Zine Scene: Anything-Goes Zines Give Specialty Publishing a Whole New Twist. STAR 
TRIB .• April 20, 1995, at lE. 
9. See Weird Reading Zines are Bright, Brash. Passionate and Different, S.F. CHRON., 
April 10, 1991, at Zlt6 (describing the content of dozens of zines): Jennifer Wer~e:~ 
Magazines With an Edge, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 5, 1995, at Kl (not.inS Lha~ t '~ed 
are an estimated 20.000 to 50,000 homeIlUlde publications distributed llJ the nl 
States). 2 at B6. 
10. See Pay Guy, These Mags Began as Zines, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug . 3, 199 , 
1996] DISTRIBUTING PUBLICATIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE 937 
In addition to student publications, there are scores of nonstudent or 
off-campus publishers who seek to distribute on campus. Some are 
producers of alternative publications in search of a diverse and educated 
audience. Other publishers are large local and national distributors of 
high-circulation papers, such as the New York Times and USA Today. 
Still others are non-campus organizations who seek to advance in part 
their social or political agenda through internally produced publica-
tions. Finally, on college campuses, like anywhere else, there always 
are industrious capitalists who advertise their products and services 
through printed pamphlets, coupon books and shoppers. 
The publications that turn up on university campuses range from 
single-sheet fliers to fuU-color catalogs, and they are distributed by 
every conceivable means: hand-to-hand, newsracks, mailboxes. vending 
machines, bookstores and bulletin boards. In light of all these variables '\\ 
and the number and diversity of publishers seeking access to university 
campuses, administrators should anticipate and prepare for conflicts, 
both between publishers and the university, and among the publishers 
themselves. What types of publications should be distributed on cam-
pus? Can a university require prior review of publications as a condition 
of distribution? Can the university give preferential access to certain 
publications? Can the university completely ban the distribution of 
publications? In what ways can a university properly regulate the time, 
place and manner of distribution? What response is warranted when 
publications are stolen by other students? These are just some of the 
questions that publishers should consider and that administrators must 
be prepared to answer. 
In order to answer these questions, administrators need to consider 
some more fundamental issues, such as the nature of public universities, 
the goals of public education and the importance of free expression in 
the educational process. Administrators additionally must recognize 
and balance the interests of all relevant parties-those of the university, 
the students and the taxpaying public. Part I of this Article addresses 
these fundamental questions and attempts to identify the important 
parties and their interests. It also contains a discussion of First Amend-
ment theory and suggests that providing liberal access to publications 
distributors through a • 'marketplace" approach is consistent with the 
interests of all affected parties. Part II contains an analysis of the 
constitutional and practical problems created by various restrictions on 
distribution. It attempts to characterize the likely judicial treatment of 
re~trictions on distribution, and also contrasts the courts' approaches 
wIth the more permissive "marketplace" approach. This section should 
s~rve as a checklist for administrators dealing with these issues and 
~so ~h~uld give publishers some sense of the scope of their rights and 
f e lUUltations of existing court precedents. Part III, the final section 
o this Article, contains a discussion of an important distribution 
problem that recently has infected campuses across the country: news-
paper theft. Although newspaper theft generally is not a constitutional 
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issue,l1 it is a free expression issue that both distributors and admin-
istrators may encounter. 
I. ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS: THE FALSE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN OPEN 
EXPRESSION AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Before analyzing the specific practical and constitutional problems 
that accompany restrictions on the distribution of publications, it is 
important for university officials to try to find a unifying justification 
for whatever approach they take. Administrators are also educators, and 
consequently need to make policy decisions that take into account the 
objectives of public education and the value of free expression. School 
policies regarding the distribution of publications and free expression 
generally are as much educational policies as they are administrative. 
Also, while a policy may be rational and efficient, it may neverthelesr. 
be inappropriate in light of the school's educational mission. 1.1 
In addition to recognizing the distinction between a sound adminis-
trative policy and a sound educational policy, it is also important for 
school officials to differentiate between what is legally permissible and 
what is educationally necessary. It is a mistake to devise a distribution 
or free expression policy by relying too heavily on court precedents. 
First, the court decisions in this area, as the next section should make 
clear, do not yield a simple and uniform set of guidelines. The decisions 
are inconsistent, and they only address distribution problems indirectly. 
There are no Supreme Court cases that have dealt with the distribution 
of publications at public universities, so any approach founded on court 
cases would be incomplete at best. Second, and more importantly, what 
the Supreme Court permits and what students and taxpayers deserve 
are two different things. It is true that, despite the First Amendment, 
public university officials have considerable discretion in running their 
campuses. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted: 
We do hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate 
rules and regulations; that it has the power properly to discipline; 
that it has power appropriately to protect itself and its property; 
that it may expect that its students adhere to generally accepted 
standards of conduct. 12 
Having concluded that a university policy is jurisdictionally and con-
stitutionally permissible, however, only begins the policymaking proc-
11. This is true unless, of course, public university officials are the ones stealing. 
See supra note 2. t 
12. Esteban v. Central Missouri S1. C., 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969~, ~~r8· 
denied, 398 U.S. 965, 90 S. Ct. 2169 (1970). See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.. of' 
. towner 836, 96 S. C1. 1211, 1217 (1976) (the government "no less than a pflva e h' h .( is 
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to w IC I 
lawfully dedicated .... "). 
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ess. The administrator must go a step farther and find an approach that 
advances the university's educational obligations in addition to satis-
fying constitutional requirements. 
The most important question for university administrators to ask in 
each situation is not whether they have the legal authority as educators 
and property owners to prohibit or restrict the distribution of certain 
publications. The fundamental question is whether it would undermine 
the university's basic educational mission to permit such distribution. 
A. The Public University and Free Expression 
America's public universities are essential institutions. In addition to 
their educative role, they also serve as important public resources by 
providing access to their facilities and by serving as centers for research 
and innovation. Public universities also serve many other functions, 
both instrumental and symbolic. For example, public universities can ~, 
become crucial centers of pluralism and integration in communities 
otherwise burdened by physical and cultural separation. In addition, 
public universities often are bastions of unorthodox thinking and even 
radicalism in communities whose political dialogue is mired in the 
middle. Public universities also are valuable venues for public expres-
sion and protest. The public university is, in the words of the Supreme 
Court, "peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. "13 
These characteristics suggest that as public institutions, universities 
should provide the greatest possible latitude for both students and 
nonstudents to use the university campus as a venue for expressive 
activity and, ideally, as a forum for dialogue. Public universities are 
symbols of openness and equal opportunity and should accommodate 
as much speech by as many people as possible. As some university 
officials likely would point out, however, public universities are charged 
first and foremost with educating students, a task that must precede 
all other concerns. While this certainly is true, administrators must not 
make the faulty assumption that a liberal distribution policy is incon-
sistent with their educational obligations. Indeed, a public education 
requires the broadest possible access to information. 
A public university education is a unique learning experience. At a 
public university, students are expected to teach themselves to a much 
greater degree than they are at many private colleges. The learning 
process tends to be more dependent on individual initiative and self-
discovery. This is slightly less the case at some private colleges where 
the process tends to be more value-laden and inculcative. Students at 
public universities expect to be around different types of people and 
expect to have substantial interaction with others, including those with 
Whom they disagree. This engagement and confrontation with others 
is an essential component in the process of public education. Even the 
13. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 2346 (1972). 
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Supreme Court has acknowledged the inseparability of open expression 
and learning. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,14 for example, the Supreme Gourt noted that "wide expOSUl'e 
to that robust exchange of ideas" is an "important part of the educa-
tional process" and should be nurtured.15 As a result, a policy that 
affords broad access to diverse sources of information is essential to 
fulfilling the promises of a public education. The marketplace theory 
described below is one approach that achieves those objectives. 
B. The Marketplace Approach to Publications Distribution 
The marketplace approach is based largely on the "marketplace of 
ideas" theory , which goes back at least as far as John Milton's 
Areopagitica , in which Milton argued that licensing and censorship of 
the press were barriers to the discovery of truth.10 The phrase 'mill' 
ketplace of ideas" was first expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v . United StatesY Although he 
used it as a simple metaphor, it has evolved into a ubiquitous rationale 
for free expression over the past 87 years . 
The marketplace approach described here starts from the premise that 
"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. "18 The 
core of the marketplace of ideas concept is the notion that truth more 
easily is discovered when ideas are allowed to be freely expressed. In 
this sense, the marketplace approach has an instrumental function . That 
is, where people are allowed to contribute freely to public discourse 
without government mediation, public policy is enriched and more 
abuses are exposed. This approach does not require, however, that 
everyone have equal access to all communicative facilities , nor that 
every idea be given equal exposure in the marketplace. What it does 
mean is that people who have the desire and the means to express 
themselves will not be denied the opportunity to do so by the govern-
ment without a compelling justification. 
While the marketplace theory has remained prominent in First 
Amendment jurisprudence for decades, it is by no means universally 
14. 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969). . 
15 . Id. at 512, 89 S. Ct. at 739-40. See also Hall v. Board of Comm'rs of Mobile 
County, 681 F.2d 965, 967 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[FJree expression is itself a vital part of the 
educational process .... "); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 198~) 
("[IJnterstudent communication does not interfere with what the school teaches; It 
enriches the school environment for the students .... "). 
16. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in MILTON'S PROSE WRITINGS (1958) 181 ("[Wjho ever 
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"). See also JOHN STUART 
MJU., ON LJBERIY (1972) . If ate 
17. 250 U.S. 616 , 630, 40 S. Ct. 17,22 (1919) (Holmes, ) .• dissenting) ("[TJhe ~ ~;th~ 
good desired is better reaChed by free trade in ideas - that the best test of trut .\ 
power of the thought to get Itself accepted in the competition of the m8rke\_~~ i1945) . 
18. Associated Press V. United States, 326 U.S . 1, 20, 65 S. Ct. 1416. 142 
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accepted. The most common criticism of the marketplace theory is that 
it does not take account of preexisting social and economic inequities. 
"Market failure" theorists point out, for example, that while every 
person has the means to express himself or herself on some level. only 
certain groups have access to the mass media. As a result, mainstream 
voices dominate the marketplace, while others are marginalized into 
virtual silence. 19 Whatever validity these criticisms have in the national 
communications marketplace, they are much less salient in the context 
of a public university. It is much easier for someone, whether or not a 
student, to counteract someone else's expression when it takes place 
within the confines of a university campus. Also, much of the market 
failure critiques focus on macro-level problems such as concentrated 
media ownership. A public university, however, is a much more dis-
crete, educated and intimate community where one can be heard with-
out access to a major media outlet. 20 While the marketplace theory may 
be limited as a universal First Amendment paradigm, it provides an 
ideal framework for dealing with free expression problems on public 
university campuses. 
In the university context, the marketplace approach has an instru-
mental function in that it can strengthen public and campus policy, 
and can foster students' personal and intellectual growth. Having access 
to "diverse and antagonistic" sources of information is essential to 
learning. 21 Students need to have their values, beliefs and knowledge 
routinely questioned, which, in a true marketplace environment, is 
certain to occur. Perhaps even more important than being exposed to 
diverse sources of information and ideas is being permitted to freely 
express oneself in the marketplace. 22 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized: 
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but 
also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expres-
sion. Such expression is an integral part of the development of 
ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expreSSion is to reject 
the basic human desire for recognition and affront the individual's 
worth and dignity. 23 
1.9. See, e.g .• BEN BAGD[)(IAN. THB MEntA MONOPOLY (4th ed . 1992) (detailing how 
ownership of the nation's media is becoming increasingly concentrated and how this has 
a sanitizing effect on content); Jerome Barron, Access to the Press - A New First 
Amendment Right. 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967) (identifying the same inequities and 
suggesting remedies. such as a public right of reply) . 
20. See supra notes 8-10. 
21. See supra note 15. 
22. Many autho1'6 have recognized the essential value of individual self-expression as 
a tool for identity creation and self-fulfillment. See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT. FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH 14-20 (1985) (referring to lndividualself-fulfillment as one of the essential purposes 
D( f free expression); LUCAS A. Pom, THE FOURl1I ESTATE AND THE CONSTlTUTlON 238-41 
1991). 
J 23 . Procunier v. Martinez. 416 U.S. 396, 427, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1818 (1974) (Marshall, 
., concurring), overruled by Thornburg v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989). 
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By implementing broad free expression and distribution policies on 
university campuses, university officials benefit their students in these 
processes. 
Under the marketplace approach, it is not the obligation of the 
university to create a "halcyon educational setting"24 where students 
are shielded from the rest of the world. This may be the modus operandi 
of some private colleges that have a more focused curriculum and 
educational approach; public universities, however, must remain pub-
liC. 25 Public universities should be forums for "uninhibited, robust and 
wide open"26 debate, even to the extent of permitting speech on campus 
that some find offensive. Those who adopt a true marketplace approach 
must have faith in the importance of conflict as a source of growth, i~ 
and in the general value of tolerance. 27 They also must have faith in " 
the "more speech" remedy. 28 There is very little that can be expressed 
in words that cannot effectively be rebutted by more speech, especially 
at a public university, where, again, being heard is not as difficult as 
it is in the larger marketplace. A liberal distribution policy ensures that 
these channels for rebuttal remain open. 
Finally, adoption of the marketplace approach is consistent with a 
public university's need to serve as a resource for taxpaying citizens 
as well as for the students and faculty who regularly inhabit the campus. 
Under a marketplace approach, access questions are often irrelevant 
because each speaker's message is valued equally and each speaker is 
given equal access to most areas of campus. The only exceptions are 
for classrooms, libraries, administrative offices and other areas to which 
access must be limited in order for the university to carry out its 
primary educational responsibilities. Most other areas of campus, how-
ever, must be made available for the dissemination of publications, 
without regard to the identity of the publisher or the distributor, and 
without regard to the content of the publication.29 
24. Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197, 1202 (4th Cir. 1985). 
25. Of course, the university can and should create places on campus where students 
can study, and certainly the university can and should ensure that classrooms and offices 
are not intruded on or otherwise disrupted. Nevertheless, it is counterproductive for a 
university to try to turn its grounds into a placid sanctuary. 
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721 (1964). 
27. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 201 (1986) ("Under the general 
tolerance perspective, the key concern .. . is that we give those wishing to confront us 
with unpopular speech activity a serious and meaningful opportunity to do so. "). 
28. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S. Ct. 641, 649 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J. , concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969) 
(' 'If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies. to avert the 
evil by the processes of education. the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence. ' ') . 
29. Exceptions might apply for publications that are not protected by the First 
Amendment. See Chapli.nsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 , 62 S. Ct. 766, 
769-70 (1942); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1969) (holding 
that speech that incites violence or imminent lawless action is not protected); Miller v. 
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The precise application of the marketplace approach is discussed in 
the next section, which attempts to outline the most important First 
Amendment questions that administrators must answer before imple-
menting or enforcing restrictions on publications distribution. 
II. RESTRICTIONS ON DISTRIBUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND 
MARKETPLACE CONSIDERATIONS 
In order to determine the precise scope of distribution rights on 
public university campuses, several questions must be answered, each 
having its own body of precedent and each, ultimately, affecting the 
extent of the distributor's rights . In order to assess the constitutionality 
of restrictions on publications distribution, there are three primary 
questions that must be answered: 
(1) What is the nature of the forum in which the publication is 
being distributed? 
(2) What is the nature of the content of the publication? 
(3) When, where and by what means is the publication being 
distributed? 
Each of these questions , as well as several important peripheral ques-
tions, will be examined below. Alternative approaches to these ques-
tions will also be suggested, consistent with the adoption of a marketplace 
approach. 
A. Nature of the Forum 
One of the most pervasive analytical constructs in First Amendment 
jurisprudence is the " public forum doctrine," or "forum analysis. "30 
In addition to analyzing the content of people's expression, courts also 
will consider where the speech occurred, assuming that speech restric-
tions are inherently more Teasonable in some places than in others. 
While several early Supreme Court decisions gave consideration to the 
location of speech,91 it was not until 1983 that the Court attempted to 
devise a framework for analyzing the context of speech.3% 
CalifOrnia, 413 U.S. 15. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973) (finding exception for publications that 
are legally obscene); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919) (finding 
exception for publications that pose imminent threats to national or domestic security). 
30. The Supreme Court explained in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Be Ed. Fund, 
473 U.S. 788, 800 , 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1984) . that forum analysis was adopted "as a 
means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property 
to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use th.e property for 
other purposes." 
31. The SUpreme Court first considered location in assessing the constitutionality of rieech restrictions In Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org .• 307 U.S. 496, 515-16, 59 S. 
t. 954, 964 (1939) (holding that public streets and parks ~ open to the public for 
expressive activity because they have been used for those purposes " time out of mind"). 
S 32. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators ' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37. 45-49, 103 
. Ct. 948, 954-57 (1983) . 
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Unfortunately, public forum analysis has grown increasingly muddled 
over the past decade. Lower court applications of the doctrine have 
been inconsistent and have revealed the doctrine's weaknesses. This is 
especially true in cases involving speech restrictions at public secondary 
and post-secondary schools. In these cases, application of the public 
forum doctrine has produced different results in similar cases. Courts 
handling these cases, moreover, have taken different approaches when 
reconciling the public forum analysis with the analysis required under 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,33 the 
Supreme Court decision which governs the boundaries of student ex-
pression in public schools. As a result, two key questions must be 
answered: First, how is forum analysis typically applied, and how 
should it be applied in the public university setting, if at all? Second, .( 
what is the applicability of the Tinker standard in public university 
cases, and how does its application comport or conflict with forum 
analysis? 
1. Basic Contours of Forum Analysis 
The Supreme Court has identified three different types of forums 
which afford speakers varying levels of First Amendment protection. 
The first of these are "traditional" or " quintessential" public forums, 
including public parks, streets, sidewalks and other places that "time 
out of mind [have] . . . been used for purposes of . . . communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. "34 In tra-
ditional public forums, speakers have the highest level of First Amend-
ment protection. Content-based restrictions35 on speech in public forums 
are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and are constitutional only if they 
serve a compelling government interest and are narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.3s The government may impose content-neutral regu-
lations affecting the time, place and manner of expression in a public 
forum; however, the state must show that those regulations are narrowly 
33. 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969) . In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that public 
school students could not be prevented from wearing black armbands as symbolic protests 
against the Vietnam War, absent evidence that such speech "materially disrupts classwork 
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others ." Id . at 513, 89 S. Ct. 
at 740. 
34. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515, 59 S. Ct. at 964. See also Frisby v. Schultz. 487 U.~ . 
474, 480 . 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500 (1988) (holding that residential streets are a pubhc 
forum); United States v. Grace. 461 U.S. 171. 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983) (holding that 
sidewalks around United States Supreme Court bu ilding are public forums). But see 
United States v. Kokinda. 497 U.S. 720, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (holding that sidewalk 
around postal office was not a pubUc forum because it was created solely to serve as a 
passageway for postal workers). 
35 . Content-based restrictions target either the subject-matter of speech (e.g .• no 
distribution of publications discussing prayer in school) or the viewpoint of speech (e.g ., 
no distribution of publications supporting or opposing prayer in school) . 
36 . See Carey v. Brown. 447 U.S. 455 . 461-62 . 100 S. Ct. 2286. 2290-91 (1980) . 
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tailored to serve a significant government interest and that they leave 
open ample alternative channels for expression.37 
In addition to establishing traditional or quintessential public forums, 
a state also may create a "limited" or "semi-" public forum, access to 
which may be restricted to certain groups38 or to discussion of certain 
topics. 3o A limited public forum is created only where a state "inten-
tionally open[s] a nontraditional forum faT public discourse; "40 it cannot 
be created by government inaction.·1 As a result, when deciding whether 
a limited public forum has been created, courts look to the policy and 
practice of the government to determine its intent."l In creating a limited 
public forum, the government may limit access to certain people, issues 
or modes of expression. Once the government has opened a forum for 
communication, however, it is barred by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments from discriminating among forum users solely on the 
basis of message content.43 Where a limited public forum has been 
created, expression in that forum is given the same First Amendment 
protection as expression in a public forum. 44 The state is not obligated 
to indefinitely maintain the open status of a forum; nevertheless, "as 
long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a 
traditional public forum.' '45 
The third type of forum identified by the Supreme Court is the 
nonpublic forum. A nonpublic forum is government property that 
neither traditionally has been used fOT public discourse. nor specifically 
has been designated for such purposes.46 Examples of public properties 
the courts have found to be nonpublic forums include: racetracks,41 
37. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 491 U.S. 781. 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 
(1989). 
38 . See, e.g .• Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S. Ct . 269 (1981) (holding that 
access to school facilities was limited to student groups). 
39. See, e.g., Madjson Joint Soh. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 
429 U.S. 167, 97 S. Ct. 421 (1976) (limiting discussion to school board business). 
40. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 802, 105 S. Ct. 
3439, 3449 (1985). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 802-03, 105 S. Ct. at 3449. Note that while a limited public forum cannot 
be created by government inaction, this does not mean that one only can be established 
through formal written decree. Intent may be inferred from government actions or 
inaction. 
43. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S . 92, 95-96, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 2289-
90 (1972). 
44. See Cornelius. 473 U.S. at 800. 105 S. Ct. at 3448. Thus, content-based restrictions 
in limited public forums, just as in traditional public forums . are unconstitutional unless 
they serve a compelling government interest and are narrowly tailored to acltieve that 
objective; content-neutral regulations affecting the time, place and manner of dlstTlbutioD 
are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government 
interest and leave open ample alternative channels for expression. 
9 45. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37, 46. 103 S. Ct. 
48. 955 (1983) . 
4'6. Id . 
'1' 47. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. New Jersey Sports & Expo-
Sl10n Auth., 691 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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airports,48 prisons, 49 military basesso and postal offices. 51 In nonpublic 
forums, expression is given substantially less First Amendment protec-
tion than in public or limited public forums; nevertheless, regulation 
therein still must be reasonable and not based on the speaker's view-
point. 52 In determining whether a regulation is reasonable, courts ex-
amine whether the expression in question is consistent with the purposes 
for which the forum was created. 53 Some courts also consider the actual 
use of the property. 54 
2. Divergent Approaches to Public Forum Analysis In the Public 
University Setting 
Three key questions arise in the application of the forum analysis to 
the public school or university setting. First, is forum analysis appr~­
priate under the circumstances? Second, and more generally, how 
should forum analysis be applied? Courts have suggested different 
versions of forum analysis, some providing more speech protection than 
others. Third, is the " substantial disruption" test from Tinker55 appli-
cable, and if so, can its application be reconciled with forum analysis? 
The Supreme Court addressed the public nature of university cam-
puses more than 20 years ago in Healy v. James. 58 The Healy court 
recognized that "[T]he college classroom with its surrounding environs 
is peculiarly 'the marketplace of ideas .' ''s7 A decade later, the court 
was more specific: "[T]he campus of a public university, at least for 
its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum. "S8 
Since then, however, the Court has not addressed directly the nature 
of public universities as public forums. Many lower courts have done 
so, however, with inconsistent results. Additionally, there have been 
some Supreme Court decisions, and scores of lower court decisions, 
dealing with free expression in public secondary schools, some of which 
are instructive with respect to public universities. 
One of the most important questions in these cases is whether the 
public forum doctrine is applicable. The federal courts have split over 
48 . See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) . 
49. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. Ct. 2532 
(1977). 
50. See Greer v . Spock, 424 U.S. 826, 96 S. Ct. 1211 (1976). 
51 . See United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 
114, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 917, 101 S. Ct. 3150 (1981). 
52. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 105 S. Ct. at 3451. 
53 . See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 50-51. 103 S. Ct. at 958. 
54 . See Multimedia Publishing Co. v. Greenville-Spartanbrug Airport Dist., 991 F.zd 
154, 162 (4th Cir. 1993). 
55. Tinker v . Des Moines Indep. Comm'y Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 
(1969). See supra note 33 for a discussion of the substantial disruption test. 
56. 408 U.S. 169, 180. 92 S . Ct. 2336, 2345 (1972). 
57. Id. at 180, 92 S. Ct. at 2346. 
58. Widmar v. Vincent , 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5, 102 S. Ct. 269, 274 n.5 (1981). 
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this issue. Some courts presume that the nature of the forum is a 
necessary threshold inquiry whenever the speech in question takes 
place on public property. Other courts, however, argue that forum 
analysis is essentially an access question, and that when the speech in 
question is by students, faculty or other people who have the right to 
be on that property, forum analysis is irrelevant.~p These courts gen-
erally hold that the constitutionality of restrictions on speech by stu-
dents should be assessed solely by application of the Tinker substantial 
disruption testOO or, as some other courts have held, by application of 
the traditional paradigms applicable to restrictions on speech in non-
school contexts. 61 In short, these courts suggest that forum analysis is 
misplaced with respect to student speech,82 and only is applicable with 
respect to speech by outside entities.53 
Courts applying these alternative approaches to forum analysis have 
argued that, at least in the high school context, the Tinker standard 
and forum analysis are mutually exclusive tests: the former is to be 
applied to student expression and the latter to nonstudent expression. 
In Slotterback v. Interboro School District,64 for example, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that 
"[F]orum analysis is irrelevant when neither access to public property 
nor state action is at issue. " 65 In most cases involving public univer-
sities , courts have relied on forum analysis and have avoided Tinker. 
The problem with this is that once a court has determined that a 
particular part of a school or university campus is a nonpublic forum, 
then university restrictions need only be reasonable and not based on 
viewpoint. 86 As a result, regulations that are subject-matter based or 
59. See, e.g., Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 290 (E.D. Pa. 
1991). 
60. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Tinker. 
61. These courts apply, for example, strict scrutiny review to content-based restrictions 
and intermediate scrutiny review to content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions. 
62 . "Student speech" has been defined as students' personal speech; that is, speech 
that is voluntary and is not dictated by another individual or group. See Board of Educ. 
of Westside Comm'y Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 288 n.22, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2392 
u.22 (1990) (Stevens , J., dissenting); Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Clr. 
1971), cerl. denied, 405 U.S. 933, 92 S. Ct. 930 (1972). 
63. See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cu. 1988) (refusing to apply forum 
analysis); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dlst., 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (D. Colo. 1989) (noting 
that the Suprema Court in Tinker did not discuss the forum statu5 of public schools). 
64. 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
65. SJotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 290. Note that the "state action" phrase as used by 
the court cloea not refer to state· imposed restraints of speech; it refers to government-
sponsored speech or speech which otherwise would carry the expUcit or implicit impri-
~atur of the school. Such speech can be regulated more freely by administrators. See 
8.Zelwood Sch. Dial. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). 
66. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 103 S. Ct. at 3451. Fo.r an example of an 
::~O~titutionaIlY viewpoint-based regulation, see San Diego Comm. Against Registration 
( ~ . . a Draft (CARD) v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Disl., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) 
s nkmg down state.funded newspaper's policy of accepting military ads but not anti-
948 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 22. No.4 
speaker-based are not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, even 
where they restrict speech that in no way disrupts the school environ-
ment. This simply does not afford speech the level of protection it 
deserves. Courts too frequently fixate on the location of speech and 
permit subject-matter-based restrictions that would be unconstitutional 
under either the Tinker standard or the standards applicable outside 
the school or university. 
Some courts have sought to remedy this problem by applying a more 
exacting version of the public forum doctrine. In caseS involving speech 
in nonpublic forums, for example. the government generally only need 
show that its regulation is viewpoint-neutral and reasonable.67 The 
Fourth Circuit recently held, however. that the reasonableness standard 
in public forum cases should be more of a "reasonableness with teeth" 
standard.68 Specifically. the Court held that even though the speech in 
question occurred in a nonpublic forum (an airport). it was not enough 
for the government to show that its regulation was rationally related to 
a legitimate government objective. More demanding scrutiny was nec-
essary because the regulation affected First Amendment activity "that 
is entitled to special solicitude even in [a] non-public forum. "69 
This begs the question: would such a standard support the imposition 
of subject-matter-based and speaker-based regulations, even though they 
are not expressly prohibited in nonpublic forums? In other words, 
under the more exacting "reasonableness with teeth" standard, could 
a plaintiff successfully argue that subject-matter- and speaker-based 
regulations are inherently unreasonable? This is a question that has yet 
to be resolved. Indeed, most courts have not adopted the "reasonable-
ness with teeth" standard. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's approach 
illustrates the confusion and disenchantment over the boundaries of 
public forum analysis and suggests that perhaps the public forum 
doctrine must either continue to evolve or be abandoned in favor of a 
more coherent approach. The Tinker "substantial disruption" test is a 
better approach in that it focuses on whether the speech in question 
actually undermines the educational process. Unfortunately, it also falls 
short of a true "marketplace" standard because it does not provide 
adequate protection to speech by nonstudents. 
3. Forum Analysis Applied 
Having outlined some of the basic problems with forum analysis and 
its intersection with other constitutional standards. it is important to 
miUtary ads) . For an example of an "unreasonable" regulation, see Multimedia Publishing 
Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist.. 991 F.2d 154. 162 (4th Cir. 1993). 
67. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 103 S. Ct. at 3451. d 
68. Multimedia Publishing. 991 F.2d 154 (striking down airport regulation that ba~e 
all newsracks. even though airport was a nonpublic forum, on grounds that the regulatIOn 
was not "reasonable" in light of the pu.rpose and actual operation of the airport). 
69. Id. at 159 . 
d 
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look at how these standards have been applied, or how they likely 
would be applied, in the public university setting. 
One of the first Supreme Court cases involving the forum status of 
public universities was Widmar v. Vincent/a decided in 1981. In a 
footnote, the Widmar court held that public universities are different 
from traditional public forums such as streets or parks in that: 
[A] university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court 
have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable 
regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its 
campus and facilities. We have not held , for example, that a 
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students 
and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access 
to all of its grounds or buildings. 71 
t . 
This quote from the Court is instructive in several respects. First, it ~, 
implies that forum analysis is appropriate in this context, even though 
the Court's decision precedes Perry by two years. Second, it seems to 
suggest that universities generally are not presumed to be traditional 
public forums. Third , it suggests that access to certain areas of campus 
can be completely closed, even to students . And finally, it establishes 
a principle that other courts have supported, which is that a public 
university legitimately may draw distinctions between students and 
nonstudents where speech rights on campus are concerned. These 
principles, for the most part, still characterize the current judicial 
approach. 
Most cases involving restrictions on expression or distribution at 
public universities have been resolved in part through application of 
the public forum doctrine. 72 The nature of these applications has varied 
with the results, but most courts deciding these cases generally hold 
that forum analysis is appropriate , even where the restrictions involved 
only affect student speech.73 
While some courts have suggested that parts of public universities 
might be considered traditional public forums / 4 most courts have held, 
70. 454 U.S. 263, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). 
71. Id. at 268 n.5, 102 S. Ct. at 273 n.5. 
72. There are some rare exceptions. See, e.g., American Future Sy5. Inc. v. Pennsyl-
vania Stat.e Unlv .. 752 F.2d 854, 863 (3d Cir. 1985). cert. denied. 473 U.S. 911 , 105 S. 
Ct. 3537 (1985) (eschewing forum analysis altogether after concluding that university 
dormitOries were neither public nor nODpublic forums). 
73 . Similarly, the courts generally do not apply Tinker in the university context, 
eveD where the speech involved is solely the personal speecb of students. 
74. See, e.g., Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 117 (5th CIr. 1992) , 
cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067 (1993) (bolding that all areas "outdoors, on grounds owned 
or controlled by the University" are public forums) . See also Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbon-
~Is High 5ch. Dist., 707 F. 5upp. 1005 (C.D. Ill . 1989) (holding that sidewalk surround-
IDg public high school is traditional pubUc forum) . Bacon suggests that there are at least 
~ome lU'Cas around campus that courts might consider traditional public forums. Generally. 
oWever, as one moves Inward from the perimeter of the school grounds, the pubUc 
nature of the property decreBses. 
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or have intimated, that public universities are public only for students 
and for others who are permitted or required to be on the campus .7~ 
There seems to be little doubt that public universities are at least 
limited public forums for use by students. As the Supreme Court noted 
in Tinker, the dedication of public property to serve specific purposes, 
such as educating students, "does not imply that the constitutional 
rights of persons entitled to be there are to be gauged as if the premises 
were purely private property. "70 Furthermore, as one court SUCcinctly 
expressed in another high school case, "[GJovernment intent to create 
public secondary schools as limited public fora , during school hours, 
fOI the first amendment personal speech of the students who attend 
those schools, is intrinsic to the dedication of those schools . " 77 Al-
though Tinker and Slotterback are both high school cases, these prin-
ciples presumably would be even more salient in the college context~~ 
where students generally are given greater freedom from university 
controV8 
While university campuses often are held to be limited public forums 
for student expression, this designation almost certainly does not apply 
to all areas of campus.19 Clearly, outdoor areas around campus, such 
as plazas, sidewalks and other open and accessible areas, would be 
considered public, at least for students. At the other extreme, classrooms 
and offices likely would be considered nonpublic forums, even for 
students. There are other campus areas, such as lobbies, hallways and 
other common areas indoors whose forum status is more difficult to 
determine. These areas do not typically come to mind when one thinks 
of traditional public forums; nevertheless, the areas share many of the 
same characteristics as sidewalks and plazas. Furthermore. if Olle sub-
scribes to the Slotterback court's holding that protection of student 
speech is intrinsic to the creation of schools, then these areas must be 
75. See. e.g. , University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson. 649 F. 
Supp. 1200, 1209 (D. Utah 1986) (holding that "the univer.sity campus is available to 
students [and student groups] as a public forum"); Glover v. Cole. 762 F.2d 1197 (4th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that campus is limited public forum for students) . Note also the 
Supreme Court's important qualification in Widmar, that the campus of s public univer-
sity. at least for its students. possesses many characteristics of a public forum. Wld,mar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 . 267 n.S. 102 S. Ct. 269. 273 n.5 (1961) (emphasis added) . 
76. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 n.6. 89 S. Ct. at 740 n .6 (emphasis added). 
77. Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist.. 766 F. Supp. 280. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
78. See Katz v. McAulay. 438 F.2d 1058. 1061 0 .5 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied. 405 
U.S. 933 . 92 S. Ct. 930 (1972) (" [W]e proceed hom the premise th.at a state may decide 
that the appropriate diSCipline which requires the restriction of certain ~ommunlcaUv~ 
actions may di.ffer in the cases of university students from that called for In the cases a 
younger secondary school pupils in relatively similar circumstances. " ). 
79. See United States Postal Servo V. Greenburgh Civic Ass·ns. 453 U.S . 114. 129. 
101 S. Ct. 2676, 2685 (1981) (noting that the First Amendment does not guarantee accesS 
to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government); Widma~t 
Vincent. 454 U.S . 263. 267 n.5. 102 S. Ct. 269. 273 n.5 (1981)(noting that pu Ie 
university need not open up all of its facilities for public use). 
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included as limited public forums. Note, however, that expression in 
these areas would still be subject to time, place and manner restric-
tions. eo 
While courts generally hold that common areas of campus are limited 
public forums for student speech, there is some disagreement about 
what constitutes "student speech. " There are some cases that suggest 
that student speech should be limited to a student's own "personal" 
speech and should not extend to the distribution of publications pro-
duced by others. Other cases, however, including at least one university 
case, have rejected this distinction. In Hedges v. Wacounda,81 the 
Seventh Circuit criticized a high school restriction that applied only to 
"nonstudent prepared materials. "82 The court held, "[I]t is umeason-
able, contrary to the school's educational mission, and dowmight 
arbitrary to prohibit students from distributing material that is prepared \4 
by others but that the distributor wishes to adopt as his or her own.' '83 
Similarly. the Fifth Circuit has suggested that if university students 
were involved with either the production or distribution of a publica-
tion, it should be treated as student expression.84 As a result, in most 
cases, any restriction on speech that is distributed by a student likely 
will be considered student speech. 
While it is true that most public universities are not presumed to be 
anything more than limited public forums for student speech, this does 
not mean that nonstudents or nonstudent groups are prohibited access 
to public universities for publications distribution. Nonstudents and 
nonstudent groups can gain access in one of two ways. First, the 
university might by policy or practice create limited public forums on 
campus which either are dedicated specifically to nonstudent speech 
or whose boundaries of access encompass nonstudent speech. For 
example, where a university authorizes or persistently acquiesces to the 
distribution of some nonstudent publications, the university might have 
created a limited public forum for these types of publications, access 
to which may not be denied to similar nonstudent publications. In 
these situations. the scope of access to the new forum is limited by the 
scope of access previously authorized or permitted. For example, if the 
university authorizes the distribution of a publication advocating abor-
tion rights, it still might be able to restrict the distribution of commercial 
fliers for a local night club. The two types of publications are different 
and, arguably, the scope of the forum created by the university only 
80. Because of concerns over congestion and safety and because of the proximity of 
~~ese areas to classrooms and offices . time. place and manner restrictions are much more 
lkely to be upheld in these a.reas. 
81 . 9 F .3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993). 
82 . Id. at 1301. 
83 . Id. 
11 84. Hays County Guardian v. Supple. 969 F.2d 111.118 (5th Cir. 1992). cert. denied. 
3 S. Ct. 1067 (1993). 
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covers political publications. Even if this argument works, 85 the uni-
versity then could not deny access to other political publications,86 and 
it certainly could not deny access to a pro-life political newspaper. 67 If 
university officials were stubborn, they could deny access to all non-
student publications and in a sense thereby close the forum;66 as long 
as the forum is open, however, they could not give differential access 
to similar publications. 69 
Aside from creating limited public forums, university officials also 
may be required to permit access to nonstudent publications where 
university restrictions on these publications are found to be "umeason-
able." It was mentioned previously that restrictions on expression in 
nonpublic forums must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. In deter-
mining whether a restriction is reasonable, courts look at the compat-
ibility of the speech with the forum's intended use. Courts typically 
have applied the reasonableness standard in a way that is highly 
deferential to the government, conSidering only the relationship be-
tween the speech and the purposes of the forum. More recent court 
decisions have recognized the need for a less literal approach (Le., a 
"reasonableness with teeth" approach). The Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, pointed out in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for 
Jesus90 that "much non-disruptive speech - such as the wearing of a 
T-shirt or button that contains a political message - may not be 'airport-
related,' but is still protected speech even in a nonpublic forum. "01 
Taking this one step farther, the Fourth Circuit recently held, "[W]ith 
respect to a nonpublic forum's intended use, the proof is in the 
pudding. We look not simply at the government's assertions of purpose, 
but also at the facility's actual operation. "92 The Fourth Circuit high-
lighted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in International Society 
85. See infro notes 45-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonableness 
of restrictions in nonpublic forums. 
86. See Widmor, 454 U.S. at 271, 102 S. Ct. at 275 (holding that once a university 
had opened its classrooms for use by registered student groups , all registered student 
groups had to be given equal access to those areas) . See olso Gay Student Services v. 
Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1001, 105 S. 
Ct. 1860 (1985). 
87 . This would be a viewpoint-based restriction expressly prohibited by the First 
Amendment. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 
103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983) . 
88. See id. at 46, 103 S. Ct. at 955-56. 
89. See, e.g .• Hays County Guardian v. Supple. 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cu. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067 (1993) (striking down a university regulation restricting distri-
bution of publications containing advertising where university permitted distribution of 
The New York Times. USA Today and a university-supported newspaper. all of which 
contained advertisements). 
90. 482 U.S. 569, 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987) . 
91. Id. at 576, 107 S. Ct. at 2573. d 
92. See Multimedia Publishing Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2 
154, 162 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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for Krisha Consciousness v. Lee,93 in which she stated that "compata-
bility" is not the proper focus; instead, courts should consider whether 
permitting speech would be incompatible, or "might actually interfere" 
with the functions of the property. 94 
Where a court applies this more exacting "reasonableness with teeth" 
standard, almost any regulation could be struck down, depending on 
the court's aggressiveness. For example, it is conceivable that a univ-
ersity'S denial of access to nonstudent publications could be considered 
unreasonable since the distribution of those publications would not 
interfere with the functioning of the university, especially in light of 
the fact that the university may still impose time, place and manner 
restrictions on the distribution of such publications. It is possible that 
continued application of this more exacting reasonableness requirement 
could open the door for publications seeking access to public univer- I' 
sities. While no court has embraced a pure marketplace approach. it is 
encouraging that some courts are at least beginning to make the proper 
inquiry. Specifically, some courts, such as the Fourth Circuit, are 
beginning to ask not whether the speech in question advances the 
purposes of the forum, but whether its expression would undermine 
the purposes of the forum. This is the key inquiry under the marketplace 
approach. 
4. Forum Analysis v. The Marketplace Approach 
As the preceding sections illustrate, public forum analysis is riddled 
with inconsistencies and provides minimal guidance to administrators 
and potential distributors of publications. Most of this confusion could 
be eliminated, however, if courts andlor university officials adopted a 
marketplace approach to publications distribution. Under a marketplace 
approach, forum analysis is unnecessary. There is no need to determine 
who is entitled to be on the property because every citizen has a right 
to be on most parts of the campus. There also is no need to consider 
the type or content of the publications that seek to distribute because 
all publications are valued equally. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
try to characterize and classify the forum because public universities 
are presumed to be appropriate forums for the dissemination of all of 
publications. 
While no court has adopted a marketplace approach to publications 
distribution, the "substantial disruption" test from Tinker95 comes 
close, although it too has been watered down by lower court applica-
tions. In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that student expression in a 
pUblic high school could be restricted only where school officials could 
93. 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992) . 
94. Id. at 2713-14 (O'Connor. J., concurring). 
95. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 
740 (1969). 
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demonstrate that the speech was substantially disruptive of educational 
activities or intruded on the rights of others. The Court added that 
school administrators must be able to show that their restrictions of 
expression are motivated by more than just "a desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint. "08 School officials must de~onstrate factual evidence ofa 
disruption. It is not enough that the expression in question "could" or 
"might' cause a disruptionY 
This is a demanding standard that at first glance seems to embody 
the marketplace approach by focusing on whether the speech in ques-
tion actually undermines the school's educational activities. o8 As cur-
rently applied by the courts, however, the Tinker standard falls short 
of the level of protection required under a true marketplace approach. 
Most importantly, courts have interpreted the phrase "substantial dis-
ruption" to encompass not only physical djsruption, but also speech 
that is so politically or emotionally charged that it creates disruption 
because of its effect on others. Under a marketplace approach, the 
offensiveness or volatility of speech almost never is a sufficient justi-
fication for its restriction.gO The other problem with the Tinker standard 
in its current form is that it generally only applies to student expression. 
As a result, it leaves the door open to greater restrictions on nonstudent 
speech. Finally, perhaps the greatest weakness of the Tinker standard 
is that courts have been reluctant to apply it in the university context; 
it is still almost exclusively a secondary school precedent. 
While the substantial disruption test of Tinker would be a better 
standard in the college context than the current judicial approach, it 
needs to be strengthened before it can be considered a true marketplace 
standard. The best approach would be to presume that public univer-
sities are open for the dissemination of publications, regardless of the 
type of publication involved, the content of the publication and the 
identity of the distributor or publisher. The only restrictions that would 
be legitimate under a marketplace approach consequently would be 
reasonable regulations governing the time, place and manner of distri-
bution. 
B. Content of the Publication 
If it is determined that relevant parts of a university campus are 
public or limited public forums for expressive activity, all those who 
96. Id. at 509 , 89 S. Ct. at 738. 
97. Id. at 508, 89 S. Ct. at 737. 
98 . See supra text accompanying note 12. 
99. As mentioned earlier, however, exceptions would apply for speech that could be 
restricted outside the university, such as speech that incites "imminent lawless acti?n,~ 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 1829 (1969), or that speech contalne 
"fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S . 568 , 572. 62 S. Ct. 766, 769 
(1942) . Government restrictions based on these precedents, however, are extremely rare. 
j 
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rightfully have access to the forum are given full First Amendment 
protection. What this means, first and foremost, is that content-based 
restrictions on speech will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.loo Such 
regulations will only be upheld if they are narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling government inte;rest.lOl As a practical matter, courts rarely 
uphold such laws.102 
Content-based restrictions come in one of two forms: they either are 
viewpoint-based10J or subject-matter-based. 104 It has been argued that 
only viewpoint-based laws should be subject to strict scrutiny;105 at the 
other extreme, it has been contended that the distinction between 
content-based and content-neutral laws should be eliminated alto-
gether. 10a The Court's current approach, however, provides that both 
types of content-based regulations (viewpoint and subject matter) are 'It 
subject to strict scrutiny.l07 Regulations can be classified as content- ~ 
based in one of two ways, according to Professor Laurence Tribe: (1) 
if, on their face, they target particular ideas or information, or (2) they 
are neutral on their face, but are adopted for a content-based purpose. t08 
There is an indefinite number of potential content-based regulations 
that a university might seek to impose on distributors of publications. 
The most obvious are regulations that, for example, prohibit the dis-
semination of information regarding abortion. affirmative action or the 
Gulf War. all of which likely would be unconstitutional because they 
prohibit discussion of particular subjects. More subtle regulations that 
are neutral on their face but that are selectively applied are also likely 
to be unconstitutional. For example, a regulation prohibiting the dis-
semination of newspapers containing advertisements would be uncon-
100. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 2290 (1972) 
("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.") . 
101. Id. at 95-96, 92 S. Ct. at 2290-91. 
102. There are exceptions, but usually only where some other fundamental right, such 
as voting, Is involved. See Burson v. Free.man, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) 
(upholding a law that prohibited the soHcitation of votes and the dissemination of 
campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place). 
103. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S. Cl. 2286 (1972) 
(law prohibited picketing in certain area, but exempted labor picketing). 
104. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S. 
Ct. 501 (1991) (law requiring the seizure of profits of books written by authors seeking 
to profit irom their crimes). 
105. See generally JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAw IN A 
NUTSHELL 34·35 (1993). 
106. Martin H. Redish, The Can lent Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 
SrAN. L. REv. 113 (1981). 
107. The Court regularly has struck down laws as content·based, even when the laws 
Were not based on viewpoint. See, e.g., Boos V. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S. Ct. 1157 
(1988); Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S. Ct. 501 
(1991); Burson V. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) . 
108. LAURENCE H . TRIBE, AMERICAl-l CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 794 (2d. ed. 1988). 
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stitutional if applied against the New York Times but not against a 
local daily paper or the university's student paper. 
Other regulations that target particular publications for special treat-
ment (not necessarily because of their content) or that otherwise apply 
dissimilar treatment to similar publications are also subject to strict 
scrutiny. Under forum analysis, similar publications cannot be denied 
access to the same forum , unless the university can prove that the 
restricted publication is somehow different from the non-restricted 
publication(s) and that it is neither the policy nor the practice of the 
university to grant access to those types of publications. For example, 
a university could not permit the distribution of Newsweek but restrict 
the distribution of Cosmopolitan unless it could show that only news 
publications are permitted on campus. Nor could the university permit 
a university-supported newspaper to distribute on campus but not 
permit a newspaper produced by some outside entity to do the same. ~, 
Again, for these types of regulations to survive, the university would 
have to rely on forum analysis and prove that the forum in question 
was created only to serve these types of publications. If this is not the 
case, however, these regulations are unconstitutional because they apply 
dissimilar treatment to legally similar publications. In other words, the 
regulations force particular publications or types of publications to bear 
special burdens.10o 
While most content-based and speaker-based restrictions are uncon-
stitutional, there are circumstances in which they might be upheld. 
First, the university might be able to demonstrate a compelling govern-
ment interest to justify content- OT speaker-based regulation. This, 
however, is unlikely.1l0 Second, there are certain categories of speech 
that are afforded less First Amendment protection, even against content-
based restrictions. For example, speech that is legally obscene ,l1I con-
tains "fighting words" ,112 or is "likely to incite imminent lawless 
action"113 is speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. In 
addition, commercial speech, while still protected expression, is subject 
to greater government regulation. Regulations targeting commercial 
publications are probably the most common content-based regulations 
in this area, and they warrant some elaboration. 
109. See, e.g . , Grosjean v. Amer. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233. 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936) (striking 
down a tax law that applied a special tax to newspapers of a certain size); Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue , 460 U.S . 575. 103 S. Ct. 1365 
(19B3) (striking down state "ink" tax that was applied differently based on the size of 
the publication); Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 4Bl U.S . 221, 107 S. Ct. 1722 
(19B7) (striking down sales tax that gave preferential treatment to certain types of 
publications) . 
110. See supra note 102 . 
111. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct . 2607 (1973) . 
112. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S . 568, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942) . 
113 . See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. Ct. 1827 , lB29 (1969) . 
d 
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1. Commercial Speech and Commercial Solicitation 
University officials have greater flexibility in restricting commercial 
speech. Commercial speech can loosely be defined as speech that does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction.ll4 Publications are 
difficult to characterize as either commercial or political (non-commer-
cial) because they often contain both commercial and political messages. 
However, it is settled that where political and commercial speech are 
"inextricably intertwined," the speech will be given the same protec-
tions as purely political speech.1l5 
Thus, most publications that sell ads merely to finance the publication 
of their non-commercial messages would not be subject to the less 
protective standards for commercial speech. However, publications that 
consist entirely of advertisements, such as shoppers or coupon books 
or advertisements reproduced on fliers or in pamphlets, would be given 
less protection. The Supreme Court has also made clear that commercial 
speech will not receive greater First Amendment protection merely 
because it contains some political speech.116 As a result, the purveyor 
of an otherwise purely commercial publication will not receive greater 
First Amendment protection by adding one or two token political 
messages . Conversely, publications cannot be characterized as com-
mercial merely because they are sold rather than given away. 117 
In 1980, the Supreme Court established a test for assessing the 
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. In Central Hudson 
Gas &- Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,118 the Court held 
that in order for commercial speech to be protected, it must concern 
lawful activity and must not be misleading. If these criteria are met, 
the government must also show that its interest in restricting the speech 
is substantial, that the restriction directly advances its asserted interest 
and that the restriction is no more extensive than necessary to serve 
that interest. 119 
Blanket prohibitions on the distribution of commercial speech likely 
are not constitutional under Central Hudson. First, while it does not 
receive the same level of protection as political speech, commercial 
speech is protected by the First Amendment and "cannot be banned 
because of an unsubstantiated belief that its impact is detrimental. "120 
114. Pittsburgh Press Co . v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
385, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2558 (1973) . 
115. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796, 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2677 
(1988). 
116. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-
75 , 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3031-32 (1992). 
117. See Heffron v. International Soc 'y for Krishna Consciousness , 452 U.S. 640, 647, 
101 S. Ct. 2559, 2563 (1981) . 
118. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. 
Ct. 2343 (1980). 
119. Id . at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2351. 
120. Lirunark Assocs . v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S . 85 , 92 n .6, 97 S. Ct. 
1614, 1618 n .6 (1977). 
I' 
I' 
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Second, the Supreme Court has held that citizens have a right to receive 
information,121 and that this right is especially important for students. 122 
Thus, the First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech must 
be outweighed by the state's asserted interests in order for restrictions 
on commercial speech to survive. For instance, in Board of Trustees of 
State University of New York v. Fox,123 the Supreme Court held that a 
public university's interests were substantial enough to prohibit the 
door-to-door sale of housewares in university dormitories. In Fox, two 
state interests were implicated by the plaintiff's distribution: the right 
of the university to control the use of its property and the right/ 
obligation of the university to secure a peaceful and studious environ-
ment for students living in the dormitories.124 It is doubtful, however, 
that Fox could be expanded to prohibit the passive distribution of 
noncommercial publications in campus dormitories, which is obviously' 
less intrusive than is face-to-face commercial solicitation. In addition, 
Fox would not be decisive with respect to restrictions on distribution 
in more public areas of campus where the university's interests as a 
property owner are less compelling. 
While purely commercial publications are given less First Amend-
ment protection, school officials must still demonstrate a substantial 
interest in restricting them, which is not always easy. It is difficult to 
conceive of a government interest that would justify restricting the 
distribution of commercial publications in public or limited public 
areas of campus. Some have argued that the university has an interest 
in protecting students from harassment and fraud. 125 Although this may 
be true, prohibiting the distribution of commercial publications is an 
ineffecti ve, or at least overreaching, remedy. Commercial speech is not 
inherently fraudulent, as some government officials seem to believe, 
and there is no reason to think that the distribution of such publications 
is any more harassing than the distribution of political publications. 
Furthermore, it is an insult to students' intelligence to suggest that 
they are less capable than school officials of identifying fraudulent 
publications. Concerns over harassment and fraud can, and should, be 
addressed through regulations prohibiting harassment and fraud. 
Another common rationale for restricting commercial publications is 
that such regulations are necessary to prevent the university grounds 
from being inundated with commercial publications distributors. 126 These 
types of crowd control arguments, however, are easily addressed through 
121. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co . v . Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S. Ct. 903, 
907 (1986). 
122. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2808-09 (1982) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
123 . 492 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989) . 
124. Id. at 472, 109 S. Ct. at 3030. 
125. See, e.g., Glover v. Cole, 762 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1985) . 
126. See, e.g., Texas Review Soc'y v. Cunningham, 659 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Tex. 
1987). 
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content-and speaker-neutral time, place and manner regulations. Ad-
ministratively, it may be convenient to target distributors of commercial 
publications in order to reduce traffic on campus, but convenience 
alone cannot support these kinds of content- and speaker-based dis-
tinctions. 
Some courts may be sympathetic to the university's concerns over 
the dissemination of commercial publications. In most cases, however, 
the restrictions will likely be struck down unless the distribution is 
coupled with some other behavior, or where the distribution takes place 
in less public areas of campus, such as dormitories, where the univ-
ersity's interests are heightened. Determined school officials are more 
likely to succeed in enforcing restrictions on commercial publications 
by arguing that these are not the types of publications included within 
the university's limited public forums. In other words, if one could ~, 
show that the areas of campus in question were never intended to 
accommodate commercial publications and that the university has never 
treated those areas as being open to those types of publications, the 
regulations might be upheld. An even better tactic, however, would be 
to adopt the marketplace approach, which recognizes the value of such 
publications, respects the intelligence of students and permits the 
distribution of all publications, regardless of their content or character. 
2. Content-Based Regulations and The Marketplace Approach 
It probably goes without saying that content-based regulations are 
particularly contemptible under the marketplace approach. The mar-
ketplace approach is committed to the notion that all publications, 
regardless of their content. have value and, subject only to reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions, should be freely distributed on 
public university campuses. This applies equally to commercial pub-
lications. Commercial publications have value to students for several 
reasons. First. they are vehicles for the transmission of commercial 
information. which students need as consumers. Second. commercial 
publications are often sources of important social, cultural, and political 
messages. even though their primary objective may be commercial. 
Also. by permitting the distribution of commercial publications on 
campus, university administrators are fulfilling the university 's obli-
gation to the public to serve as a forum for all expression. As an added 
bonus, administrators need not agonize over how to characterize par-
ticular messages because all publications are treated equally under a 
marketplace approach. Administrators ' arbitrary assessments of the 
character, genre or value of speech generally are not helpful under 'the 
marketplace approach. and indeed they are often antithetical to it. 
In summary, any regulations that make distinctions based on the 
subject matter or viewpoint of a publication. or that apply differential 
treatment to publications. are inconsistent with the marketplace ap-
proach. Furthermore, because forum disUnctions are not relevant under 
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the marketplace approach, content-based and speaker-based restrictions 
are not justifiable even in areas that courts might consider nonpublic 
forums. The only regulations that are consistent with the marketplace 
approach are content-neutral and speaker-neutral regulations directed 
at the time, place, and manner of distribution . These restrictions are 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
C. Time, Place and Manner of Distribution 
Despite the fact that a particular publication is entitled to First 
Amendment protection and is distributed in a public forum, the uni-
versity may nevertheless impose reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions on its distributionY7 Courts have acknowledged that uni-
versity officials have the right to control the use of their property and 
may impose housekeeping regulations, even where those regulations ~\ 
indirectly affect students ' speech, provided the regulations do not target 
speech. 126 Such regulations must also be narrowly tailored to serve a 
substantial government interest and must leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication .1Z9 
Time, place and manner regulations (TPM's) are given greater def-
erence by courts because their ostensible purpose is not to single out 
particular ideas, content or speakers for disparate treatment. In other 
words, any restriction on speech imposed by these regulations is inci-
dental to the government's legitimate objectives. At the same time, 
however, while some regulations are facially neutral , they have a 
substantial effect on particular speakers or groups of speakers. For 
example, regulations requiring that aU publications be distributed in 
certain areas of campus may have the effect of a total ban if either the 
area is not highly populated or is segregated from the distributor's 
target audience . All of this suggests that from the standpoint of pub-
lications distributors, TPM's should not be taken lightly; TPM's can be 
as prohibitory as content-based or speaker-based regulations while at 
the same time being less vulnerable to First Amendment challenge. 
Among the most common types of TPM's in this context are: (1) 
regulations that either prohibit the installation of newsracks or restrict 
their placement; (2) regulations that establish a licensing or prior review 
system for distribution of publications; (3) regulations that restrict 
"hawking" and other direct solicitation; and (4) regulations that restrict 
publications for the ostensible purpose of preventing litter. Each of 
these will be discussed in turn. 
1. Newsracks 
The Supreme Court has held that the distribution of literature is 
protected by the First Amendment.13O This principle has been applied 
127. See Ward v . Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781. 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746. 2753 
(1989). 
128. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S . 367 , 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968). 
129. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S . Ct. at 2753. 
130. Lovell v . Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452. 58 S. Ct. 666, 669 (1938). 
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equally to the distribution of newspapers via newsracks. 131 Blanket 
prohibitions on the installation of vending machines or distribution 
boxes on public university property likely would be unconstitutional. 
It is unlikely that university officials could demonstrate a sufficiently 
substantial interest to justify such a rule. 132 If university officials could 
show that newsrack distribution was "incompatible with the normal 
activity of a particular place," the regulation might be constitutional.133 
This, however, is unlikely to occur in areas of campus that are public 
or limited public forums. These areas are by their very nature appro-
priate locations for the dissemination of information. Furthermore, even 
in those areas that are nonpublic forums, a complete ban may be 
unconstitutional if the regulation poses too great a burden on speech 134 
or if the regulation is unreasonable in light of the ways in which the 
forum has been used. 135 
Regulations affecting the placement of newsracks are much more ~, 
likely to be constitutional than complete bans.136 For example, regula-
tions that prohibit "structures" from being left on public lawns , 137 or 
that prohibit the placement of newsracks in areas that would pose a 
threat to public safety, 13B are not uncommon. These types of regulations 
are typically upheld, provided they do not burden "substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate inter-
ests, "139 and provided they produce significant gains in safety and 
aesthetics. 14o Of course, these regulations might not be constitutional if 
they singled out certain publications because of their content or applied 
different treatment to similar types of publications. 
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,141 the Supreme Court 
struck down a municipal regulation that prohibited the distribution of 
"commercial handbills" on public property, which was used as the 
basis for ordering the removal of certain newsracks in the city. Even 
though the city had a substantial interest in safety and aesthetics, it 
could not seek to weed out the number of newsracks by targeting lower-
level speech. The Court held that the content-based distinctions were 
131. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 673 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
132. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. City of Newport, 665 F. Supp. 107 (D.R.1. 
1987) (holding that government's concerns over aesthetics were insufficient to justify a 
prohibition of newsracks). 
133. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (1972). 
134. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (striking down city ordinance 
prohibiting all lawn signs on grounds that city's asserted interest in aesthetics was 
insufficient to justify restricting an entire medium). 
135. See Multimedia Publishing Co. v. Greenville-Spartanbrug Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 
154, 162 (4th Cir. 1993). 
136. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Crivaro, 851 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1988). 
137. Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988). 
138. Washington Post Co. v. Turner, 708 F. Supp. 405 (D. D.C. 1989). 
139. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791, 799, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989). 
140. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1509 (1993). 
141. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). 
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not justified and did not constitute a reasonable fit between the harm 
(aesthetics and safety) and the remedy (ban on commercial handbills) 
where both commercial and non-commercial publications contributed 
equally to the problem. 142 
For university administrators, this suggests that they may not target 
commercial publishers. as they are wont to do, unless the commercial 
publishers are more responsible for the harm sought to be remedied. 
Again. however. the university might be able to make such distinctions 
if it can show that the forum in question is not a public or limited 
public forum for commercial publications. 
2. Licensing and Prior Review 
Regulations that establish a distribution licensing system or any sort 
of prior review are constitutionally suspect, although not necessarily 
unconstitutional. In Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 143 the 
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a licensing scheme that gave a 
particular government official "unfettered discretion" to decide which 
venders may place their newspaper vending machines on public prop-
erty. The Court held that while the state has an interest in directing 
the placement of structures on public property, any regulations must 
establish precise criteria on which applications are to be reviewed. 144 
Otherwise. the Court held. it would be impossible for a rejected dis-
tributor to prove that a denial of permission was based on the content 
or viewpoint of the publication.14s 
Any system of prior review or licensing must be content- and view-
point-neutral in addition to containing precise criteria for the imposition 
of any pre-publication requirements . These criteria must be even more 
precise than what is required under the Due Process Clause for regu-
lations authorizing subsequent punishments. 116 Examples of predistri-
bution regulations that have been upheld by the courts with respect to 
the placement of newsracks include the payment of licensing fees , 141 
142. rd. at 1507. See also Forsythe County v. Nationalist Movement. 505 U.S. 123. 
112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992). 
143. 486 U.S. 750, 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988). 
144. rd. at 772, 108 S. Ct. at 2152. 
145. rd. 
146. See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1988). The Burch court 
explained, "[A1 system oJ prior restraints is in many ways more inbibiUng than a system 
of subsequent punishments; It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider 
range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by a 
stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through. a criminal 
process; the prooedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process: 
the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and criticism; the dynamiCS of 
tbe system drive toward excesses, as the history of all censorship shows." Cd. at 1155 
(citing THOMAS EMERSON. THB SYSTEM OF FREE ExPRESSION 506 (1970)). 
147. Gannett Satellite Info. Network v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth ., 745 F.2d 767 (2d 
Clr. 1984) . Note that a licenSing fee may only be used to offsat costs incurred by the 
stale in prOViding a.ccess to its public rights of way, e.g., maIntenance costs. See Sentinel 
Communications Co. v. Watts , 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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requirements that vending machine owners purchase liability insur-
ance,146 and regulations requiring that newsracks meet certain appear-
ance standards.149 Similar regulations aimed at publications being hand-
distributed would be much more difficult to enforce. The government's 
interest is clearly heightened when permanent or semi-permanent struc-
tures are being used. 150 
What is clearly prohibited is a system of prior review in which 
administrators retain discretion to prohibit, restrict, edit or in any way 
modify the content of the publication being reviewed. This is a classic 
system of prior restraint that is at the apex of the First Amendment's 
prohibitions. lsl The presumption against the constitutionality of prior 
restraints applies in public schools and universities as it does else-
where.152 Also, it does not matter that a university's practice is not to 
interfere with the content of the publications it reviews; as long as the 
university retains that authority, it likely will be unconstitutional. As ~\ 
the Supreme Court has pointed out, "It is not merely the sporadic 
abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its 
very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.' '153 
Similarly, the fact that a university claims that a system of prior review 
is being instituted solely to identify publications containing unprotected 
speech (such as obscenity) does not save it from the presumption against 
prior restraints; such a system makes protected expression "vulnerable 
to gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments. "154 
Finally, the Supreme Court generally has found unconstitutional any 
system in which the government serves as an unwanted intermediary 
between a speaker and a listener. For example, the Court in Lamont v. 
Postmaster General, 155 struck down a federal law that allowed the post 
office to withhold and eventually destroy "communist political prop-
aganda" unless the addressee affirmatively requested that the infor-
mation be delivered. 
Given all of these precedents, it is likely that any system of prior 
review will be unconstitutional where it gives university officials the 
148. Jacobson v. Harris, 669 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir. 1989). 
149. Gold Coast Publications v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1994). 
150. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 265 U.S. 105, 52 S. Ct. 2140-41, (1932). 
151. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S . 713, 714, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2141 
(1971) (per curiam) (holding that prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional). 
The Supreme Court has suggested that only three types of publications may warrant the 
imposition of a prior restraint: publications that are obscene, incite violence or jeopardize 
national security. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931). The Court 
also has upheld prior restraints in cases involving Sixth Amendment fair trial rights. See 
Cable News Network v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976, 111 S. Ct. 451 (1990). 
152. See, e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1986); Ysleta Fed'n of Teachers 
v. Ysleta Indep . Sch. Dist ., 720 F.2d 1429 (5th Cir. 1983); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 
F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970). 
153. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 86, 97, 60 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1940). 
154. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D. Mass. 1970) (citing Bantam 
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S . 58, 66, 83 S. Ct. 631, 637 (1963]). 
155. 381 U.S. 301, 85 S . Ct. 1493 (1965) . 
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authority to interfere with the content of publications. or to restrict the 
distribution of those publications based on their content. The only 
systems of prior review that might be permissible are those that focus 
solely on the means of distribution. such as those dealing with the 
appearance, placement and maintenance of newsracks . 
3. Hawking and Commercial Solicitation 
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that soliciting funds-
at least for political purposes- faUs within the core protections of the 
First Amendment.156 many lower courts recognize distinctions between 
distribution and solicitation. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a state 
can restrict commercial solicitation on public property even where it 
allows distribution, because solicitation and distribution are distinct 
activities.157 This distinction has been upheld in the public university 
context as well. Iri Glover v. Cole,158 the Fourth Circuit held that even 
though a public university was a limited public forum. the state's 
interest in protecting students from harassment and fraud was sufficient 
to justify a ban on commercial or political solicitation by nonstudent 
groups. At least one federal district court also has upheld limitations 
on commercial solicitation on a public university campus.1S9 
Whatever limitations might be imposed on commercial solicitation 
should not have much impact on the distribution of publications. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that publications do not lose full First 
Amendment protection merely because they are sold rather than given 
away.l60 Nevertheless some universities have placed limitations on 
"hawking" - that is , the face-to-face sale of publications. University 
officials have argued, and some courts have agreed. that hawking poses 
dangers of disruption, congestion, harassment and duress. 1Sl Whether 
these concerns are substantial enough to warrant restrictions on hawk-
ing on public university campuses is not clear. However, one federal 
district court has upheld prohibitions on hawking in campus areas 
reserved for tables for student organizations. 162 
It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court's statement in Heffron 
that publications are protected whether sold or given away can be 
reconciled with a restriction on hawking, which by definition is simply 
the sale of publications. If the Supreme Court's statement in Heffron 
means what it says, then can the hawker be distinguished from the 
156. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S. 
Ct. 826, 833 (1978). 
157. United States v. Belsky, 799 F.2d 1485 (11th Cir. 1986). 
158. 762 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1985). 
159. Texas Rev iew Soc'y v. Cunn ingham, 659 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Tex. 1987). 
160. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647, 
101 S. Ct. 2559, 2563 (1981). 
161. See Hays Co . Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 119-21 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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"lonely pamphleteer"163 who traditionally has been afforded substantial 
protection?164 Is it possible to reconcile this distinction with the Su-
preme Court's statement in Discovery Network that distinctions between 
different types of speech are unconstitutional where each type of speech 
contributes equally to the harm sought to be remedied?165 This is a 
question that courts may have to address in the future. For now there 
is at least some judicial authority to support certain university restric-
tions on hawking. 
4. Litter and Other Considerations 
One of the most common justifications for TPM restrictions on the 
distribution of publications is the prevention of litter. While this is a 
pervasive justification, it is routinely rejected by courts. In fact, one of 
the first TPM cases decided by the Supreme Court involved a city I' 
ordinance that banned leafletting on city streets, ostensibly to prevent 
litter.166 The Court struck down the ordinance because the government's 
objectives could be achieved through less restrictive means. As the 
Court succinctly stated, "There are obvious methods of preventing 
litter. Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw 
papers on the street. "167 Given this unequivocal precedent, university 
administrators will find it difficult to sustain regulations that restrict 
distribution for the purpose of preventing litter. More generally, uni-
versity administrators will have to show that all of their TPM regulations 
are sufficiently precise so as not to burden too much speech. As the 
Court noted in Frisby, a regulation "is narrowly tailored if it targets 
and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to 
remedy. "166 
Under the marketplace approach, the primary concerns with respect 
to TPM's are that they do not inordinately burden speech and that they 
are not used as fronts to disguise more nefarious objectives. The 
marketplace approach is not concerned with the imposition of TPM's; 
it is only concerned with their precision. 
III. NEWSPAPER THEFT 
To those who publish and distribute publications on university cam-
puses, one of the most maddening problems to have emerged over the 
past few years is newspaper theft . With increasing frequency. university 
stUdents (and occasionally faculty and administrators) are addressing 
their concerns over content by resorting to the most desperate form of 
163. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2668 (1972) . 
164. See Lovel v . Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938) . 
165. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1509 (1993). 
166. Schneider v . State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939). 
167. Id. at 162, 60 S. Ct. at 151 . 
168. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2503 (1988). 
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censorship. While newspaper theft is not a new problem, especially to 
those who distribute free publications, it seems to have escalated 
recently on college campuses around the country. The Student Press 
Law Center (SPLC) in Washington, D.C., which monitors censorship in 
colleges and high schools, reported that from 1992 to 1994, about 
140,000 papers were stolen at 36 different universities. 16g Newspaper 
theft has become so common that editors often may have more to fear 
from angry readers than from university administrators. 
Newspaper thieves are a diverse group. They come from every con-
ceivable social, political and ideological faction, and they attack the 
entire spectrum of publications. For example: 
• At the University of Maryland and Dartmouth College, papers 
were stolen by groups protesting racism;170 
• At Southeastern Louisiana University and Trenton State Uni-
versity, papers were stolen in response to student government and 
election stories;171 
• At the University of Florida, papers were stolen to protest 
coverage of conflicts among the campus College Republicans;172 
• At Penn State University, papers were burned to pl'Otest their 
allegedly sexist and homophobic content;173 and 
• At the University of Central Arkansas, papers were hoarded to 
prevent people from learning the name of a student accused of 
rape .174 
These are just a smattering of the issues that have motivated recent 
newspaper thefts. ' 
The problem of newspaper theft began to receive some national 
attention three years ago during the confirmation hearings of Sheldon 
Hackney, President Clinton's nominee to head the National Endowment 
for the Humanities. Hackney, then President of the University of Penn-
sylvania , was under attack for his feeble response to a massive news-
paper theft at Penn. After a group of students calling themselves " The 
Black Community" stole nearly 14,000 issues of the Daily Pennsylvanian 
to protest its allegedly racist content, Hackney issued a hollow statement 
169. Richard Daigle, Analysis: Collegiate Censorship by Theft, ATLANTA CaNST., March 
G, 1994, at F1. Obviously, this is only the number reported to the SPLC. There likely 
were many more thefts that were not brought to the SPLC's attention. 
170. Censorship by Theft Vexes Colleges , CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1993, at A20 . 
171. Id. 
172 . Good Enough to Steal: College Papers are Stolen Across the Nation as Students 
Dispose of Words Rather Than Disprove Them, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Fall 
1993 , at 4 . 
173. Mary Jordan, Students Who Set Off Penn Newspaper Censorship Uproar Won't 
Be Punished, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1993, at A12 
174. Id. 
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in which he merely noted, "two important university values, diversity 
and open expression, appear to be in conflict. "175 Students, faculty and 
others outside the University vigorously protested Hackney's noncha-
lance.176 Hackney later said in an interview that he "did not condone" 
the newspaper theft, but he did not offer any public condemnation of 
the act either, nor did he impose any punishment on those involved 
in the theft.177 In fact, one year after the incident, the participants 
declared victory and reflected on the theft as some sort of watershed 
act of heroism. Kaplan Mobry, one of the organizers of the theft, called 
the operation "social cosmetic surgery," insisting that the "the internal 
substance of the actions has produced an immediate impact that will 
carry Penn into the year 2000. "178 
To anyone concerned with free expression, Mobry's braggadocio 
should stand out as a particularly callous celebration of censorship. 
Whatever the validity of his group's underlying claims, their methods 
reflect a contempt for dialogue and a disturbing indifference to anything 
but the immediate attention they received. While Mobry and other 
newspaper thieves often profess some noble objective to justify their 
actions, newspaper theft at its core is nothing more than a prior restraint 
of the press. It is the press counterpart to the "heckler's veto. "179 
Unfortunately, while government-imposed or -sanctioned prior res-
traints are presumptively unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment,180 there is no constitutional recourse when the culprits are private 
persons. The First Amendment cannot be invoked in the absence of 
state action,181 and without any kind of prophylactic constitutional 
175. Dale Russakoff, At Penn. the Word Divides as Easily as the Sword. WASH. POST. 
May 15. 1993. at Al. 
176. See, e.g .. Jordana Horn. When Being Politically Correct Makes a Mockery of 
Justice. L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at M3. See also RUSSAICOFF, supra note 175 (noting 
that a group of fifteen University of Pennsylvania law professors wrote an open letter to 
Hackney criticizing him for not taking a stronger stand on free expression) . 
177. Hackney's replacement at the University of Pennsylvania also refused to punish 
the students involved. See JORDAN, supra note 173, at A12. 
178. Howard Goodman, A Changed Penn, and Yet . .. It's Been a Year Since the 
"Water Buffalo" Case: The Controversy Still Simmers, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 15, 
1994, at Cl. 
179. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S . 131, 133, 86 S. Ct. 719 (1966), (citing HARRY 
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140-60 (1965)). For a case involving 
the "Heckler's Veto," see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S. Ct. 303 (1951) 
(upholding police arrest of speaker in response to audience's hostile comments) . 
180. New York Times Co. v . United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 , 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2141 
(1971) (per curiam) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity .") . 
181. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " 
U.S. CaNST. amend. I (emphasis added). This prohibition on Congressional action was 
incorporated via the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to apply equally to 
actions by state governments. See Near v . Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931) 
(striking down a state public nuisance statute, as applied to the press , as a violation of 
c' 
.' 
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barrier, victims of newspaper theft. are usually left without a remedy. 
Although legal remedies are available, such remedies vary across 
jurisdictions. Even where specific criminal statutes are in place, they 
are rarely invoked by police and district attorneys. As of 1993, the 
SPLC had heard of only one criminal prosecution for newspaper theft. 
In that case, four students at the University of Florida were required 
to serve 25 hours of community service and pay court costs after they 
were caught stealing copies of the Florida Review, a conservative 
campus newspaper.182 More recently, two students at Penn State Uni-
versity agreed to go through a rehabilitation program after being charged 
by the local district attorney with theft, receiving stolen property and 
criminal conspiracy.183 In addition, the student who organized the 
confiscation of papers at Southeastern Louisiana University was even-
tually charged with criminal mischief,l84 but his case was dismissed 
after a judge decided that it was not a crime to take something that 
was free. 185 The fact that student papers are often distributed for free 
is one of the key obstacles to using criminal sanctions against newspaper 
thieves . At least one state has sought to remedy that problem. The 
Maryland Legislature recently passed a law that makes it a misdemeanor 
to take more than one free newspaper for any kind of censorial pur-
pose.186 While this type of legislation is laudable, it is unlikely to have 
any impact until police, district attorneys and judges begin to view 
newspaper theft as something more than a college prank. 
In the absence of any dependable legal or constitutional remedies in 
this area, the .role of university administrators has special significance. 
Administrators are often the only remaining source of authority capable 
of imposing some kind of sanction on newspaper thieves . Unfortunately, 
many administrators have mirrored Hackney's feckless approach. Rather 
than get in a political imbroglio, many administrators either have 
ignored the incidents on their campuses or have acknowledged a 
conflict and walked away. The University of Wisconsin and the Uni-
versity of Central Arkansas are among dozens of schools whose admin-
istrators have refused to get involved after papers were stolen on 
campus;181 no one was punished for the thefts at these universities. 
Meanwhile, at Dartmouth College, the administrative response went 
beyond indifference and amounted to a tacit endorsement of newspaper 
the First Amendment). The First Amendment, however, is not a barrier to actions by 
non-government people or organizations. 
lB2. There for the Taking? College Journalists Do Have Options for Stopping Newspaper 
Theives, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REpORT, Fall 1993, at 13 . 
lB3. A Crime Wave : The Trend Continues as College Newspapers are Stolen From 
Coast to Coast, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Winter 1993-94, at 30. 
1B4 . MILLER, supra note 4, at AS . 
185 . DAIGLE, supra note 169. at Fl. 
lB6. Maryland Law Makes Taking Newspapers a Misdemeanor, STUDENT PRESS LAW 
CENTER REPORT, Spring 1994, at 33 . 
lB7. Good Enough to Steal : College Papers are Stolen Across the Nation as Student~ 
Dispose of Words Rather Than Disprove Them, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Fal 
1993, at 5. 
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theft. After issues of the conservative Dartmouth Review were stolen 
on several occasions, Dean of Students Lee Pelton issued a press release 
stating that the students had "neither broken any laws nor violated the 
College's Code of Conduct. "188 Pelton also said that the Dartmouth 
Review is "a newspaper and it has value, but we treat it as abandoned 
property. There 's no rule that says how many copies you can pick 
up. "189 
The internal struggle that administrators likely experience in these 
situations is understandable. They often are presented with a "Hobson's 
Choice:" punish the thieves and be labeled callous authoritarians, or 
refuse to punish them and be lampooned as politically correct jellyfish. 
Still, university administrators are not politicians; they are leaders who 
should be expected to take stands, regardless of the personal conse-
quences. Toward this end, administrators actually have plenty of tools 
at their disposal. . 
The first of these tools is the student disciplinary system. Some '~t 
university administrators have no direct control over student discipline; 
at most universities, however, there is at least some material adminis-
trative role. When such authority exists, it should be exercised, much 
like it was recently at the University of Maryland. At UMA, two students 
were punished through the student disciplinary system for stealing 
10,000 copies of the campus paper. The students were placed on 
probation and were required to perform community service and write 
papers summarizing the Supreme Court's rulings on censorship.190 
Another approach, which is more symbolic but often equally effective, 
is to use the bully pulpit to make clear to students that newspaper 
theft will not be tolerated. This is especially important when the 
perpetrators have not been caught (and usually they are not) .191 Larry 
Benedict, Dean of Student Services at Johns Hopkins University, was 
quick to denounce the theft of newspapers at his university even while 
criticizing the paper's content in the same breath. 192 Benedict's response 
illustrates a recognition that supporting free expression is not a partisan 
act. In fact, it is largely value-neutral, or at least politically neutral. 
The fact that some people might misconstrue such support should not 
deter any university administrator committed to free expression on his 
or her campus. 
In addition to simply speaking out on these issues, administrators 
also should consider reinforcing their rhetoric with actual school pol-
icies identifying newspaper theft as a punishable act. It is always best 
to put students on notice of any conduct thought to be unacceptable, 
166. Id . at 9. 
169. MILLER, supra note 4, at A5 . 
190. Retha Hill, 2 Students at U-Md. Disciplined, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1994, at C3 . 
191. Newspaper Theft's Cure is Action, STUDENT PRESS LAw CENTER REPORT, Fall 1993 , 
at 3. 
192. Brooke A . Masters, At Johns Hopkins, Fury Over Racial Cartoon: Student News-
paper Assailed for Publishing Slur Against Asians, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1993, at B5. 
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especially when punishment from other sources is uncertain at best. 
These are just a few of the possible responses to newspaper theft that 
administrators can take, each of which is acceptable. The only unac-
ceptable approach is for administrators to ignore the problem altogether. 
To do so is to effectively condone what is a conspicuous act of 
disrespect and intolerance. 
CONCLUSION 
The distribution of a publication from one person to another is one 
of the most basic kinds of expressive activity. This kind of communi-
cation, deserving of the highest level of First Amendment protection, 
a.pplies equally, and perhaps especially, on the campus of a public 
Q 
university. The Supreme Court has recognized that the public university \( 
is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas. This is true not merely because 
public universities traditionally have served as centers of expression 
and debate, but also because by allowing diverse access to its facilities 
for expressive activity, public universities fulfill a basic educational 
objective. 
The legal boundaries governing restrictions on the distribution of 
publications are not easy to discern. Administrators who rely on court 
precedents to set their policies will encounter a certain amount of 
inconsistency. But more importantly, they will inevitably adopt policies 
that are too restrictive and that do not respect the values of diversity, 
conflict and student independence. Administrators should not take cues 
from the federal courts because courts deal only witll what is consti-
tutionally permissible, not with what is educationally sound. 
The alternative approach suggested here is one that is consistent witll 
the basic educational mission of most public universities; it is a liberal 
policy that respects an expression and is grounded in the belief that 
tolerance and more speech are the most rational remedies to expression 
that is inaccurate. caustic, offensive or annoying. Under this approach, 
distributors of publications are given full access to most areas of 
campus; they are not restricted in any way by regulations targeting the 
content or sponsorship of their speech; and they are not subjected to 
content-neutral regulations that pose too great a burden on their ex-
pression. Finally, under this approach, administrators have an affir-
mative obligation to take action against newspaper thieves and others 
who seek to tyrannize public expression. In the end, the marketplace 
approach is the only approach that truly advances the goals of public 
education. 
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